What does man know? For years beyond count the scholarly elite and plebeians alike have toiled over the issues berthed in human minds as a result of the theory of knowledge. What is knowledge? Is it relative or is it objective? Can a belief be justified as a truth? Can people truly know anything at all? The diversity among the philosophical viewpoints of history’s most prominent academians does nothing, but add to the obscurity of the subject matter, making a firm grasp around a solid answer to the questions presented seem unattainable. Figures, like Rene Descartes, will argue, under the position of the rationalist, that knowledge is possible with the use of reason (Felder 126). Other philosophers, such as George Berkeley and John Locke, who both hold empiricist views, will also argue that knowledge can be gained. Their positions will hold that an application of logical reasoning combined with observation from the normal senses is the way to acquire knowledge (Felder 119). When attempting to tackle such a daunting subject intellectual perception must be conditioned to see and understand that there is no black and white; that a vast mass of gray areas exist and must be accounted for to validate any argument. Since efforts to prove or disprove that human beings can have truths are oriented on the basis of assumptions about the valid practices of creating knowledge (Hall 330) it can be sagaciously postulated that an acquisition of knowledge is, indeed, possible. Moreover, there is knowledge that is objective as well as knowledge that is relative.
When building an argument it is important to first erect a foundation. So, in order to build a foundation fitting the proposed argument it is necessary to get some sort of clutch on what knowledge is. To David Hume, “the devastating skeptic… knowledge of any sort is an illusion” (Letwin 134). This viewpoint, however is flawed. For all intents, constructions, and purposes let the term knowledge be defined as an awareness and a familiarity with factual information and or principles. When such a simple definition can be manufactured why is the task of determining whether or not people can have knowledge met with so much difficulty? This is because a great number of philosophers, though brilliant, are quite stubborn and choose not to acknowledge the idea that there is more than one type of knowledge. Therefore, to visit the issue of the possibility to gain knowledge responsibly, one can not ignore the actuality of tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge. Tacit knowledge refers to the knowledge that is rooted in individual experience with respect to beliefs, perspectives, and values while explicit knowledge refers to recorded or formal knowledge (Polanyi 12). When considering the existence of both tacit and explicit knowledge, the flaws in the position of Hume become exposed. When pitted against explicit knowledge Hume’s “illusion” theory is defeated, for knowledge can not be an illusion when things that people know are manifest in reality. For instance, it is known that if a fuel injected motor vehicle runs out of gas the engine will not start until more fuel is deposited into the gas tank. If Hume’s analysis were true the result of running out of gas would merely be an illusion and the vehicle would still run. While his notion may work against many tacit knowledge situations it crumbles against cases that involve explicit knowledge. Consequently, this verifies that Hume’s illusion ideology is erroneous. Furthermore, it reinforces the argument that human beings can obtain and maintain knowledge.
Explorers of the world of epistemology can divide it into three broad areas of inquiry based upon the following three questions: What are the limits of human knowledge? What are the sources of human knowledge? What is the nature of human knowledge (Muis 317)? It does not take a very in depth analysis to realize that these questions will yield answers that have situational variance. A holistic approach to human epistemology is inadequate as all people have incalculable differences. It thus becomes necessary to relegate experimentation and study to the realm of personal epistemology, creating case studies that garner data about individuals rather than groups. Scholars who choose to ignore the aforementioned gray areas might make the case that knowledge depends on the individual or contend that knowledge is completely independent of the individual. In opposition, the sensible disputant who recognizes the legitimacy of the gray areas will present, with greater success, the argument that truth rests between these two extremes. First of all, there is no possible way that the procurement of knowledge can rest solely on an individual. Why not? Well, in order for an individual to gain knowledge the individual must first be created. Individuals do not, can not, and will not ever create themselves. Others are responsible for the birth of an individual whether the child is conceived as a result of the practice of sexual intercourse by a man and a woman or by artificial insemination with participation from a woman, a sperm donor, and a doctor. Therefore, by default, those persons responsible for an individual’s introduction into the world share in the responsibility for any knowledge that individual acquires in his or her lifetime. Secondly, to say that knowledge is completely independent of the individual is a mindless claim to make. A conceptualization that makes use of tangible objects can quickly and easily render this argument null and void. If a young woman has, in her grasp, an encyclopedia is it independent of her? No. So how then can knowledge be independent of its holder? It can not be.
The idea that human beings can not know anything is absurd. While many philosophers who argue that people are unable to know anything do present meritorious positions they are too easily refuted. Even if it is true that humans truly can not know anything, the truth of the argument alone would nullify it. If a philosopher knows that people can not know anything that philosopher knows something. How can such a philosopher rationalize this? The truth is that the statement is irrational, so there is no rational defense. So, in closing I hold these two truths to be self-evident: that human beings can and do have knowledge.
Felder, David W. Yes We Can: Philosophy for Change. Tallahassee: Wellington P, 2008. 118-133.
Hall, John R. "Epistemology and Sociohistorical Inquiry." Annual Review of Sociology 16 (1990): 329-351.
Letwin, Shirley R. "Hume: Inventor of a New Task for Philosophy." Political Theory 3.2 (1975): 134-158.
Muis, Krista R. "Personal Epistemology and Mathematics: a Critical Review and Synthesis of Research." Review of Educational Research 64.3 (2004): 317-377.
Polanyi, Michael. The Tacit Dimension. Garden City: Anchor Books, 1967. 10-13.
